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Abstract In this paper we propose benchmark values for the coeﬃcients
of relative risk aversion and relative prudence on the basis of a binary choice
model where the decision maker chooses between aggregating or disaggragating
multiplicative risks. We relate our results to the decison maker’s willingness to
trade-oﬀ the second with the first and the third (central) moment of his wealth
distribution.
1 Introduction
Since the early 70’s, it has been known that unity is a benchmark value for the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (RRA for short; defined as −u
00(X)
u0(X)X where
u is the vNM utility function). Indeed, in papers dealing with portfolio and/or
saving decisions such as Hahn (1970) and Rothschild - Stiglitz (1971), results
are shown to depend upon a comparison between unity and the RRA coeﬃcient.
Later papers (e.g., Fishburn - Porter (1976), Cheng - Magill - Shäfer (1987) and
Hadar - Seo (1990) to name just a few) have confirmed the early results and the
reader can refer to Meyer - Meyer (2005) for a recent survey.
Since the concept of prudence is more recent than that of risk aversion, the
notion of relative prudence (RP for short; defined as −u
000(X)
u00(X)X) is much less
discussed than that of relative risk aversion. However, the scant literature that
exists suggests that the benchmark value for RP is 2 (see, e.g., Hadar - Seo
(1990) and Choi - Kim - Snow (2001)). In these papers, it appears indeed that
a second order dominant shift in the return of a risky asset increases its demand
if RP is lower than 2. These results are summarized in Gollier (2001).
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Quite interestingly, in all these models the benchmark values for RRA and
RP are the consequences of an optimizing behavior and they do not result from
an analysis of individual preferences1.
The purpose of this note is precisely to justify the two benchmark values
without reference to any specific choice problem. We show indeed that the
two benchmark values can be obtained from a preference for disaggregating
harms in a model of "risk apportionment". This idea was recently used by
Eeckhoudt - Schlesinger (2006) to give an interpretation of the signs of successive
derivatives of a utility function in a context of additive risks. By considering
instead multiplicative risks, we obtain the benchmark values for RRA and RP
as a consequence of a preference for "harm disaggregation".
Our note is organized as follows. In the second section, we illustrate the
concept of risk apportionment applied to multiplicative risks. The next section
contains the main result related to the benchmark values for RRA and RP . In
the fourth section, we give an interpretation of the results in terms of attitudes
toward moments of a distribution. We then briefly conclude.
2 Multiplicative risks
In 2006, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger have used the principle of "preference for
pain disaggregation" and they have applied it to additive risks to justify the
alternating sign of successive derivatives of a utility function. In this way they
could reinterpret the concepts of prudence and temperance outside the decision
models, in which these concepts had been defined, e.g., by Kimball (1990, 1992).
Loosely speaking, pain disaggregation means that faced with two equally
likely states of nature, a decision maker always prefers to receive one of two
harms for certain (i.e., one in each state) as opposed to either facing the two
harms jointly or facing none of them.
To apply the idea to multiplicative lotteries, consider an individual with
initial wealth x of which a share k (0 < k < 1) may be lost with probability
equal to 12 . If there is also a probability of
1
2 to lose a share r (0 < r < 1), the
principle of pain disaggregation means that lottery B2 is preferred to lottery A2
with
x(1–k) (1–r)
x
1/2
1/2
A2 
x ( 1  – k )
x ( 1  – r )
1 /2
1 /2
B 2  
1The only exception that we are aware of is a paper by Choi - Menezes (1983) who discuss
the value of RRA from the concept of a "probability premium".
2
Lottery B2 is preferred to lottery A2 since indeed the two harms are disag-
gregated in B2: they do not occur jointly as in A2.
Instead of two sure losses, consider now a situation with one sure multiplica-
tive loss (−k) and a zero-mean random (multiplicative) return, eε ∈ [−1,∞),
which is a harm for a risk averse decision maker. Preference for pain disaggre-
gation states that B3 should be preferred to A3 with
x(1 – k) (1 + ε~) 
x 
1/2 
1/2 
A3 
x (1  – k)
x (1  +  ε~ ) 
1 /2
1 /2
B 3  
In the next section, we show that in the expected utility model (EU), such
preferences induce the benchmark values of respectively RRA and RP .
3 Benchmark values
We now consider a decision maker with utility function u(·) who obeys the
EU axioms and is risk averse (u00 < 0) and prudent (u000 > 0). We propose to
characterize an individual who prefers lottery B2 to lottery A2 and lottery B3
to lottery A3 as defined in the previous section.
Consider first a decision maker faced with the two lotteries A2 and B2. Then
we have that for any pair (k, r) ∈ (0, 1)2,
B2 Â A2
m
1
2
u [x (1− k)] + 1
2
u [x (1− r)] > 1
2
u [x (1− k) (1− r)] + 1
2
u [x]
m
u [x (1− k)]− u [x] > u [x (1− k) (1− r)]− u [x (1− r)] .
To examine the RRA coeﬃcient, we proceed in two steps. First, we define a
function v such that v (r, k;x) def= u [x (1− k) (1− r)]− u [x (1− r)], and obtain
that B2 Â A2 iﬀ v (0, k;x) > v (r, k;x) for all (k, r) ∈ (0, 1)2. A necessary and
suﬃcient condition for B2 Â A2 is thus that
vr (r, k, x) < 0
m
−x (1− k)u0 [x (1− k) (1− r)] + xu0 [x (1− r)] < 0
m
u0 [x (1− r)] < (1− k)u0 [x (1− k) (1− r)] .
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Now define function w such that w (r, k, x) def= (1− k)u0 [x (1− k) (1− r)] .
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for B2 Â A2 (all (k, r) ∈ (0, 1)2), is then
that w (r, k, x) is an increasing function in k, that is
wk (r, k, x) > 0 (all (k, r) ∈ (0, 1)2)
m
−u0 [x (1− k) (1− r)]
−x (1− r) (1− k)u00 [x (1− k) (1− r)] > 0 (all (k, r) ∈ (0, 1)2)
m
1 +X
u00 [X]
u0 [X]
< 0 (all X > 0).
We therefore obtain that lotteryB2 is preferred to lottery A2 iﬀRRA exceeds
1. Notice at this stage the diﬀerence with additive risks. For additive risks, as
shown in Eeckhoudt - Schlesinger (2006), concavity of the utility function (i.e.,
risk aversion) is suﬃcient to justify a preference for disaggregating additive sure
pains. Our analysis shows that for multiplicative pains, matters are less simple:
for a decision maker to accept the disaggregation of sure multiplicative pains,
his degree of risk aversion must be "high" enough (RRA > 1). On the other
hand, Chiu and Madden (2007) obtain that some criminal activities are less
desirable when risk increases if individual admits a RRA < 1.
Consider now the possibility of a zero-mean risk of return loss. Lottery B3
is preferred to lottery A3 iﬀ for all zero-mean random variables, eε ∈ [−1,∞),
and all k in (0, 1),
1
2
u [x (1− k)] + 1
2
Eu [x (1 + eε)] > 1
2
Eu [x (1− k) (1 + eε)] + 1
2
u [x]
m
Eu [x (1 + eε)]− u [x] > Eu [x (1− k) (1 + eε)]− u [x (1− k)] .
In a similar way as previously, we define function v such that v (k, x) def=
Eu [x (1− k) (1 + eε)]− u [x (1− k)] and obtain that B3 Â A3 (for all k ∈ (0, 1))
iﬀ v (0, x) > v (k, x) (all k ∈ (0, 1)). A necessary and suﬃcient condition for
B3 Â A3 is then that
vk (k) < 0
m
−xE (1 + eε)u0 [x (1− k) (1 + eε)] + xu0 [x (1− k)] < 0
m
u0 [x (1− k)] < E (1 + eε)u0 [x (1− k) (1 + eε)] .
In a second step, we define function w such that w (k, ε, x) def= (1 + ε)u0 [x (1− k) (1 + ε)] .
Remembering that Eeε = 0 and vareε > 0, we can write that B3 Â A3 (for all
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k ∈ (0, 1)) iﬀ Ew (k,eε, x) > w (k,Eeε, x) . This condition is satisfied if function
w is strictly convex for all ε ∈ [−1,∞), that is
wεε(k, ε, x) > 0 (for all k ∈ (0, 1), ε ∈ [−1,∞))
m
2x (1− k)u00 [x (1− k) (1 + ε)]
+x2 (1− k)2 (1 + ε)u000 [x (1− k) (1 + ε)] > 0 (for all k ∈ (0, 1), ε ∈ [−1,∞))
m
2 +X
u000(X)
u00(X)
< 0 (for all X > 0).
A comment similar to the one made for risk aversion applies here. When
the sure loss and the zero mean risk are additive, positive prudence (u000 > 0)
implies a preference for pain disaggregation. However, in the multiplicative
case the condition is more demanding: the preference for pain disaggregation
requires that prudence be strong enough (RP > 2).
4 Moments
In this section, we provide an interpretation for RRA and RP as measures for
the decision maker’s willingness to trade-oﬀ diﬀerent moments of her wealth
distribution, and we show that the benchmark values obtained in the previous
section are limiting trade-oﬀs.
Consider the first two moments of lotteries B2 and A2. Easy computations
reveal that
EXB2 = x[1−
1
2
k − 1
2
r] (1)
EXB2 −EXA2 = −
1
2
krx < 0, and (2)
varXB2 − varXA2 = −kr[1−
1
2
(k + r) +
1
4
kr]x2 < 0. (3)
Taking a second order Taylor expansion of u around the mean outcome under
lottery B2, and taking expectations, we get
Eu(XB2) ' u(EXB2) +
1
2
u00(EXB2)varXB2 , and
Eu(XA2) ' u(EXB2) + u0(EXB2)(EXA2 −EXB2)
+
1
2
u00(EXB2)[varXA2 + (EXB2 −EXA2)2].
Therefore,
Eu(XB2) ≷ Eu(XA2)
m
u00(EXB2)
£
varXB2 − varXA2 − (EXB2 −EXA2)2
¤ ≷ u0(EXB2)(EXA2 −EXB2).
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Using expressions (2) and (3), this comparison results in
Eu(XB2) ≷ Eu(XA2)
m
−u
00(EXB2)
u0(EXB2)
∙
EXB2 +
1
2
krx
¸
≷ 1,
so that for small values of k and r the critical value for RRA approaches 1.
When RRA equals 1, the lower variance of lottery B2 exactly compensates
for its lower expectation and the decision maker is indiﬀerent between B2 and
A2. Should RRA exceed 1, lottery B2 would be preferred. Indeed when RRA
exceeds 1, risk aversion is pretty strong so that the lower variance of B2 becomes
relatively more attractive.
Turning now to lotteries B3 and A3 we notice they have the same mean, but
they diﬀer in their variance and third central moment (denoted μ3):
EXB3 = EXA3 = x[1−
1
2
k] (4)
varXA3 − varXB3 = −
1
2
x2[1− (1− k)2]Eε2 < 0 (5)
μ3XA3 − μ3XB3 = −
1
2
x3[1− (1− k)3]Eeε3 − 3
4
x3k[1 + (1− k)2]Eε2.(6)
Because lotteries B3 and A3 have the same mean, the decision maker now
faces a trade-oﬀ between the second and third moments. Taking expectations
of the third order Taylor expansions of u(X) around the (common) mean gives
Eu(XA3) ' u(EX) +
1
2
u00(EX)varXA3 +
1
6
u000(EX)μ3XA3
Eu(XB3) ' u(EX) +
1
2
u00(EX)varXB3 +
1
6
u000(EX)μ3XB3 ,
so that
Eu(XB3) ≷ Eu(XA3)
m
−u
000(EX)EX
u00(EX)
≷ 3varXB3 − varXA3
μ3XB3 − μ3XA3
EX. (7)
Absolute prudence is thus trice the willingness to substitute the second for the
third central moment. Under the assumption that Eeε = 0, making use of (4)-(6),
the rhs of (7) reduces to
[1− (1− k)2](2− k)
k[1 + (1− k)2] ,
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with the limiting property
lim
k→0
[1− (1− k)2](2− k)
k[1 + (1− k)2] = 2.
Thus a decision maker becomes exactly indiﬀerent between small gambles of
type B3 and A3 when his RP equals 2. Then the increase in variance in B3 is
exactly compensated for by the increase in the third central moment2.
5 Conclusion
The existing literature on savings and portfolio choices under risk has revealed
that quite often decisions taken by individuals depend upon the values of their
coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion and relative prudence. More specifically the
benchmark values of RRA and RP , taken into consideration inside these models
of choice, are respectively 1 and 2.
In this note, we have given a more fundamental interpretation of these bench-
mark values which is related to the individual’s preferences and not to a specific
problem of choice. This result has been obtained by applying to multiplicative
risks the notion of risk apportionment that was used for additive risks in order
to justify the sign of successive derivatives of a utility function.
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